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Stabilization Policies in the World Economy: Scope and Skepticism
ABSTRACT
Throughout the industrialized world, macroeconomic performance since
the mid-l970s has been very poor, and the prospects in the near term remain
bleak. While there is no consensus among macroeconomists regarding the
diagnosis (or cure) of these ills, the major competing schools of thought
have focussed most of their blame on macroeconomic policy. This paper
summarizes a series of studies, in collaboration with Michael Bruno,
suggesting rather that supply shocks coupled with real wage rigidities are
a central source of the poor macroeconomic performance. Various hypotheses
are mentioned as a source for the resistance to real wage cuts, and some
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Throughoutthe industrialized world, macroeconomic performance since
the mid-1970s has been very poor, and theprospects in the near term remain
bleak. It is sobering to reflect that all 24 OEC[) economies suffereda slow-
down in aggregate econnmic growth after 1973(comparing average growth rates
for 1965-73 with 1973-79); all but one (Switzerland)experienced an intensifi-
cation of consumer price inflation. Overall, the annual GNPgrowth of the
OECD slowed from 4.9 percent during 1965-73 to 2.7percent during 1973-79, and
it has slowed further since then. The slow growth hastranslated into rising
unemployment, which stood at about 7 percent of the OECD workforce in 1981as
compared with a mere 2 to 3 percent in 1970. In the European Economic Commu-
nity, the 1981 unemployment rate appears to have been a staggering 8percent.
Bright spots in this picture are few indeed, but their ]cssonsmay
be instructive. After the steep recession in the OECDduring 1974-75, the
U.S. alone of the major economies staged a rapidrecovery; the unemployment
rate fell significantly below its 1975 peak, while it continued to rise in
Europe. Unfortunatc'lv, U.S. performance on most measures has deteriorated
sharply (and relatively) since 1979. Japan provides a case of extremely suc-
cessful performance since the mid-1970s, after avery sharp jolt during 1973-75.
Among the smaller economies, the neighboring Nordic economies of Sweden and
Finland offer a vivid contrast of worsening and improving economicdevelop-
ments, respectively since the mid-1970s.
There is no consensus among macroeconomists regarding the diagnosis
of these ills, the sources of relative success acrosseconomics, or most impor-
tant for the purpose here, the right policy mix for sustainedrecovery. The
interpretations offered here, which must he regarded as tentative,lay grct-2-
stress on the various adverse supply shocks thataffected all of the OECfl
economies during the past decade. Theinterpretations are based largely ona
JOiflt researchproject with Michael Bruno, of HebrewUniversity, on the mdcro-
economics of supply disturbances inopen economies.
I. The Central Role ofSupj Pisturbances
The major competing schools ofmacroeconomic thought have focused
most of their blame for the current debacle
on macroeconomic policy. For the
Keynesians, recent policy has hocn tooaustere, overly directed against fight-
ing inflation. For the monetarists, thecase has been almost the opposite:
that politicians have continued to driveup money growth to fight short-terr
unemployment, to the sacri lice of longer-term price stabi 1ity. Andforthe new
classical macroeconomists,the policies have simply been tooerratic, with policy
"Surprises"explaining the fluctuations inoutput growth.
Unfortunately, these important propositions havebeen subjected to
almostno systematic, cross-country scrutiny. Nostrong comparative evidr'nce
has been set .forth to show that highunemployment and slow growth have been
closely tied to more restrictive policies, or tomore uncertain and volatile
policies, or that price stability has resulted from slowand stable money growth.
Recent tests of the "surprises" model, forexample, failed on Japanese data
(see Jun'jchjro Seo and Wataru Takahashjj. Thereis little doubt that tight
policies can explain high unemployment at certain timesand places (the Thatcher
experiment in the LJ.. is a case in point; see WillemBuiter and Marcus Miller),
but it is doubtful that they providea general explanation for the recent ex-
perience. The almost universal slowdown ingrowth and rise in unemployment in
the OECD has characterized both activistand passive, as well as expansionary-3-
andcontractionary policy regimes. To cite just twocases, neither the aus-
tere Barre policies in France nor theexpansionary Keynesian policies in Sweden
restored high employment or rapid growth to theireconomies.
I would suggest three lessons onmacroeconomic performance and policy
from the tangled comparative record.First, it is not the policy choices hut
rather the policy options that worsened in thel970s, with supply shocks driv-
ing the stagflationary process. Second, theappropriate policy response to
high unemployment or slow growth depends on thesource of the unemployment, with
"Supply-generated" unemployment less tractable then thegarden-variety Keynesian
unemployment. And third, since national economic structuresdiffer, particu-
larly in labor market and financial institutions, thesame policy is likely to
have very different effects across economies.
Various "supply-side" shocks were ofdominating importance in the
l970s. All industrial countries faceda massive rise in the real price of raw
materials inputs after 1970, following two decades offalling real input prices.
The oil price increases (in 1973-74,1979-80) were the most stunning, hut by no
means the only majoi hikes in real commodityprices. Overall, the index of non-
fuel primary input prices rose sharply relativeto prices of final manufactured
goods in the 1970s (see Robert Lipsey andTrying Kravis). Accompanying thec
shocks was a persistent slowdown in total factorproductivity growth in almost
all of the OLd). The synchronization of theslowdown with the raw material price
increases suggests a causal linkage running fromprices to output (as suggested
by Martin N. Baily and Bruno, for example) but thislinkage rcmdins an open ques-
tion. Many,suchas DavidGrubb, Richard Jackman, Richard Layard, and William
Nordhaus, take the productivity slowdown to be an independentevent. A third
supply shock, from the point of view of the OECD, has been therapid expansion
of the newly ind&istri.Iizing countries(NICs) into traditional export sectors-4-
ofthe OECD economics (e.g. steel, shipbuilding, electronic components). This
import-competing growth of the NICs hasworsenedthe OECI) terms of trade, and
perhaps more importantly, has shifted the locus of new world investment in key
industries decisively away from the developed economies. It is forecast, for
example, that about half of the world's capacity expansion in steel during
1980-1985 will be made in the developing economies, up from percent in the
1970s.
On a theoretical level, the economics of supply shocks are fairly
well understood (see l3runo and Sachs (1981a, 1981b) and Sachs (1980b) for
general equilibrium analyses in the case of output-market clearing, and
Edmond Malinvaud and Robert Solow for the non-market clearing case).Consider,
for example, a rise in real input prices. In a competitive, full-employment
economy a permanent input price shock reduces output on impact, and mo;t likely
sets in motion a path of capital decumulation, along which output and produc-
tivity grow more slowly than trend. For a given money supply, the nominal
priceand wage leve]S may eitherrise or fall after theshock; if the output
effectof the shock is small, the risein real input prices probdbly requires
thefall ofother nominal wages and prices. And very importantly, the real
wageconsistent with full employment (hereafter, the "full-employment real
wage") must fall on impact,andthen must grow more slowly than trendas the
processofcapital accumulation proceeds.
Fromthe point of view of macroeconomic equilibrium, then, there are
two problems. After the supply shock, the nominal price vector may be inap-
propriate given the existing money stock and exchange rate. If nominal prices
and/or wages are sticky, a standard demand management problem arises (with the
standard short-run inflation-unemployment tradeoffs, if they exist). Edmund Phelps
has described this demand-side issue of supply shocks in detail. Thesecond,-5-
and more novel policy issueinvolvesthe need to reduce real wages to their
new full-employment path. Most recessionsup until 1973 signalled little about
the need for long-term realwage adjustment, while the resolution of post-1973
recessions has depended on the deceleration ofreal wages from an earlier
trend. And for reasons that we shallsee, such a deceleration is only likely
after a transitory phase of highunemployment, and is also likely to he hard to
bring about with standard macroeconomic policytools.
For a number of years after 1973 (at leasttwo years in most countries;
four to five in others) OECD real
wage growth remained strong relative to produc-
tivity growth, and profitability was sharplysqueezed (see Sachs (1979) and Bruno
for details). The rate of returnon manufacturing capital fell steeply between
1973 and 1978 in most ecc•nomies. Only in theU.S., where unionization rates are
extraordinaril>; low, was the profit squeeze largely avoided.The evidence is
not strong on whether the real wage behavior reflectsunion wage-setting se
or more general outcomes in the labor market. It issignificant though, that
in both the U.K. and U.S. there was asharp rise in the union-non-union wagc
differential over the course of the 1970s.
The profit squeeze was closely linked tooutput, investment, and
growth behaviorafter1973, with the relatively favorable U.S. profitposition
inducingamore rapid recovery (see Sachs (1979)). The links ofwages to un-
employmentinthisperiod arebestdocumented for the U.K. (see James Symons
for a detailed presentation; R. Morley; Brunoand Sachs (1981h)), and econo-
metricwork supports this link for Japan (flavidLipton and Sachs). Indeed,
Japan provides a revealing comparison of adjustment to the firstand second
oil shocks.in the first, real wage growth remainedhigh, and profits and
output were sharply squeezed; in the second, there was a dramaticdrop in real
wagegrowth for 1979-SO, which maderoom for .Japan's terms-of-trade loss.-6-
Output growth hardly dipped in the second episode (see Sachs (198Ic) and
Yoichi Shinkai for supporting evidence).
Real wages may fail to adjust for manyreasons, and each of these
reasons has different implications for policy. We can divide thepossible ex-
planations into categories which emphasize:(a) uncertainty, timing, or mis-
perception; and (b) union bargaining power. Most directly, sonicwages may be
predetermined by contract at the time of an unanticipatedsupply disturbance,
sothat real wages areunexpectedly driven above full-employment levels. If
renegotiationiscostless, the profit squeeze would soon disippear, but other-
wisethe squeeze must persist until the next bargaining round.Herbert Giersch
has suggested such a view for the high realwage settlements in Germany in 1974
(in Germany, the misperception was twofold, involving both oilprices and tight
Bundesbank policy).
A related argument holds that unions, or bothemployers and unions,
failed to understand the link of higher oil prices andwage moderation, and
the ordeal of unemployment was necessary to "clarify" that link.This simple
argument probably holds enormous weight. The supply shocks were a novel
phenomenon.There was no way prior to the late 1970s to evaluatethe partial
elasticityof labor demandwith respectto real energyprices, or to verify
thata persistent slowdown inproductivitygrowth had occurred. An assev-
erat..onby employerstoemployees of the need for real wage declinesis, in
general,of little avail, for employers have reason to dissimulate andemployees
havecause to ignore their employer's importunings. The inability of employers
to convey credibly to workers the need for realwage moderation has been ele-
gantlycaptured by Sanford Grossman and Olivcr Hart. Adverse shocks intheir
modelbumpagainst partial real wage rigidity, and therefore cause unemployment.
Their results directly transfer to our case. If thishypothesis is maintained,-7-
we should expect to see a gradualprocess of wage moderation after a supply
shock, as workers gain evidence (through thePersistence of unemployment) that
the adverse demand shift against labor hasin fact occurred. Moreover,we would
expect learning between the first (1973-74) and second oilshocks (1979) re
garding union wage setting. According to Shinkai,Japan is a vivid illustra
tion of such learning, for formerly militantunion federations explicitly
called for wage moder,tion in 1980, inlight of Supply-side developments. One
federation's"offensive whitepaper" declared: "Our wage demand (in 1980) is
basedonour assessment of the impact of oil-price rise andgrowth prospect,
and aims at a real wage increase lower thanthe real GNP growth." (p. 19)
The previous explanations all apply ina basically competitive labor
market setting. Moretroubling casesemerge once we recognize the extent of
monopolyunion power in OECD labor markets,particularly throughout Europe.
In the U.S. we often forget that muchofEuropean wage setting occurs in a
highly centralized, highlyunionized context.And when powerful unions face
off against employers, supply shocksmay well redound on unemployment rather
than wage reductions. To our benefit, TanMcDonald and Solow have recently
offered a smorgasbord of models that make thatvery point. There is simply
nopresumptionthat an Optimi Zing Union will substantiallycut reil wigcs,
ratherthan employment, following a supplyshock; indeed, it may even raise
th em!
ii .pli cat ions for i)cinand Management Po1 i Ci CS iflOpellconomlos
From the veryaggregative standpoint then, supplyshocksmay raise
the "typical" problem that the nominalpriceand wage are outof line with
moneysupply and the exchange rate, and the novel case that realwages exceed
theirfull employmentlevel.If outputmarketsdo not clear, we may adopt-8-
Malinvaud'stypology: the first problem would push the economy into there-
gime of Keynesian unemployment, andthelatter towards classical unemploym('nt.
Demand stimulus is effective in the first case (subjectto Mundell-Flemixig
limitations) but not in the latter, unless the demand stimulus itself(say an
exchange rate depreciation) can reduce real wages by accelerating inflation.
In recent models, particularly Sachs (1980b) and Brunoand
Sachs (1981a), I hate investigated these policy issues undera variety of labor
market assumptions (in these models, the output market is assumedto clear con-
tinuously, so that the economy is always at the boundary of Keynesian and
classical regimes). Consider one useful specification, whichdistinguishes
between the "bargained" real wage the actual real wage w, and the full-
employment real wage w' (see Grubh,Jackman, and Layard for a similarformulation).
We assume that unions and firms bargain for a realwage (w), but set a nominal
wage that is only partially indexed (or perhaps fully indexed with a lag).
Actual wages (w) can deviate in the short run from B,becauseof unantici-
pated or accelerating inflation. The bargained wage itself is assumed tore-
spond only to unemployment, in order to capture the partial realwage rigidity
I have discussed above.
Now, we can envision various relations among B, w, and Generally,
unemployment will result when w > hutthis can occur with high or low real-
wage bargains.Ifw>w=w',unions and firms would settle on a lower real
wage, but because of partial nominal wage rigidity, they do not achieve it. This
is a case where a money supply increase or exchange rate devaluationcan readily
reduce unemployment (at the cost of a higher price level).Unemployment is
basically a monetary problem.
On the other hand, if w = > thewage bargain is intentionally
setabove (asdiscussed earlier, unions may misperceive or maychoose-9-
unemployment in return for higher wages). In this case, a monetary expansion
can temporarily reduce w, and increase employment, but only in the short run.
Long-run, fu1l-ap1oyment equilibrium requires that w8 he reduced to (or
f . B that w be raised). For concreteness, suppose that Lw =c(Ut),where Ut
the unemployment rate.'1 cn, 1/a(w -w)measuresthe cumulative unemploy-
ment that must be experienced before long-run equilibrium is restored. The
unemployment may he postponed through rising inflation, but it cannot he avoided
in the long run through expansionary monetary policy. Simulation exercises
show that expansionary policy very often results in higher inflation and deeper
unemployment along the adjustment path than does a passive policy.
It should he pointed out that a fiscal expansion may raise and
thus moderate unemployment by favorably shifting the economy's terms of trade
(see Sachs (1980) for an example). Moreover, direct supply-side measures may
f also raise w .Spaceprevents elaboration of these two poss]bllltIes here.
I close with a talc of two countries, Sweden and Finland, that vividly
confirms the difficulty of preventing, rather than merely postponing, supply-
shock unemployment.
The year-to-year GNP developments in the two countries in the nmid-1970s
wec:
1973 1974 1975 1976 1977 1978 1979
Finland 6.5 3.1 0.6 0.3 0.3 2.3 7.2
Sweden 3.8 4.2 2.5 1.6 -2.4 1.3 '1.1
Swedenutilized very expansionary policies during 1974-76 to "bridge" the
world recession (see OLCD Economic Surveys for Sweden and Finland for recent
policy history), and indeed open unemployment did not developin the early
yearsof the 1)01 icy (tboughhi &lden unemployment, such as work ers in government
job-trainingprograms, did). But neither did real wages moderate. A wage boom—
andsevere profit squeeze ensued, which ushered in a number of years ofvery
poor growth. Moreover, the expansionary policies left a legacy of a greatly
expanded government sector. In Finland, the decision to abandon reflatjon
was taken much earlier (1975), with a view towards restoring profitability
and competitiveness inFinland'sexport sector. The output drop in Finland in
1975-76 was far more severe than in Sweden, and Finland's realwage gap (itS
measured by the OECD) was eliminated in 1976. The growth since 1977 hasbeen
farhigher.
111. Conclusions and Fxtc'nions
The recessions in the 1970s were inherently more painful thanpre-
vious episodes since theysignalledthe need for real wage moderation and a
period of slow economic growth. In some countries, the need for realwage
moderationwas accepted byworkerswithout the ordeal of unemployment (e.g.
Japan, 1979-80), while in others, the adjustment process seemed to require a
recession.In such countries, expansionary demand policies serve mainly to
postpone rather than prevent an economicdownturn.
Of course avarietyof additional issues should be raiseti ina com-
plete treatment of the recent supply shocks. Higher energy prices and competi-
tionfrom the NICs call for sectoral reallocation ofresources, as well as
overall wage and price adjustments. One suspects that in a boomingeconomy,
sectoral shifts of therequisitemagnitude could be handled instride.In
thepresent environment, though, policy makers have supported moribundindus-
triesandprotective labor legislation has slowed down the flow of workers to
moreprothictive enterprises. These inefficiencies have magnified Iurope's
adjustmentprobleni significantly.— 11—
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